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Abstract 
Repeated episodes of Chinese public pressure against the United States during 2009 and 
2010 on a wide range of issues involving seas near China, Taiwan, Tibet, and economic 
disputes are subject to different interpretations but on balance they do not seem to 
seriously upset the prevailing positive equilibrium between the US and Chinese 
governments. 
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Introduction 
Relations between the United States and China emerged as the most important 
bilateral relationship in the 21st century.  China’s global economic importance and rising 
political and military power came in a world order where the United States faced many 
challenges but still exerted broad leadership reflecting its superpower status. Whether 
the two powers will support international peace and development and pursue more 
cooperative ties, will become antagonistic as their interests compete, or will pursue 
some other path in world affairs, remains the subject of ongoing debate among 
specialists and policy makers in both countries.1 
Publicly, officials in China and the United States tended for much of this decade to 
emphasize the positive aspects of the relationship. These include ever closer trade and 
investment ties leading to deepening economic interdependence of the United States 
and China. Converging security interests involve dealing with international terrorism, 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, UN peacekeeping and other issues involving 
sensitive situations in Asia and the world. China has come far in the post Mao Zedong 
(d. 1976) period in adopting norms of free market economic behavior supported by the 
United States and essential to China’s success in dealing with the conditions of 
economic globalization of the current era. China also has substantially changed policies 
on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to conform more to US-backed 
international norms.  
US-China collaboration on climate change and environmental issues has grown in the 
recent period, and bilateral discussion on human rights continues amid mixed reviews 
on progress in China toward accepting US-backed international norms. US-China 
differences over Taiwan have subsided with the coming to power in 2008 of Taiwan 
President Ma Ying-jeou, who has sharply shifted Taiwan toward a more cooperative 
stance in relations with China. In broad terms and with some reservations, the US 
government accepts and supports the Chinese Communist administration as a leading 
actor in world affairs; the Chinese administration has moved to accept, at least for now, 
the existing international order where the United States exerts leading power in Asian 
and world affairs.2 
The benign image of China-US relations that flowed from recent public discourse of US 
and Chinese officials was reinforced by prominent commentators, particularly in the 
United States, emphasizing the convergence of interests between the United States and 
                                                      
1  Aaron Friedberg (2009). “Is China a Military Threat?—Menace,” The National Interest (September-
October 2009, 19-25, 31-32.  
2  Kenneth Liberthal (2009). “The China-US Relationship Goes Global,” Current History 108: 719 
(September 2009) 243-246. 
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China. Some argued for an international order determined chiefly by cooperation 
between the two governments, what is called a “G-2” world order for the 21st century.3 
In practice, however, Sino-American relations remain more complicated and conflicted 
than recent official discourse and arguments by commentators in favor of a Sino-
American international condominium would lead us to expect. A review of the many 
decades on Sino-American relations shows enormous changes over time, with patterns 
of confrontation, conflict, and suspicion much more prevalent than patterns of 
accommodation and cooperation. The past four decades have featured sometimes 
remarkable improvements in relations as leaders on both sides have pursued practical 
benefits through pragmatic means. That the base of cooperation is often incomplete, 
thin, and dependent on changeable circumstances at home and abroad shows as the 
societies and governments more often than not demonstrate salient differences over a 
variety of critical issues involving security, values, and economics. If one gets below 
the surface of recent positive official discussion, a review of developments and trends 
shows officials, elites, and public opinion on both sides demonstrating suspicion and 
wariness of the other country and its possible negative intentions or implications 
affecting Sino-American relations. 4 
 
Positive Equilibrium in Relations between the US and Chinese 
Administrations 
Fortunately for those seeking improvement in Sino-American relations, the many 
differences between the United States and China more often than not were off-set in 
the first decade of the 21st century by circumstances that caused the two leaderships to 
pragmatically manage their differences while seeking to avoid trouble and where 
possible develop common ground. The process was not uniform or smooth, but the 
result was a positive equilibrium between the US and Chinese administrations that 
appeared likely to persist into the second decade of the 21st century, despite many 
differences and disputes.5  
During this period, both the US and Chinese administrations became preoccupied with 
other issues; they generally seemed reluctant to exacerbate tensions with one another. 
Growing economic interdependence and cooperation over key issues in Asian and world 
affairs reinforced each government’s tendency to emphasize the positive and pursue 
constructive relations with one another. The emerging positive stasis in US-China 
relations provides a basis for greater cooperation over economic, security and other 
interests and issues. 
Differences in strategic, economic, political and other interests also have remained 
strong; they represent major obstacles to further cooperation between the two 
countries. Policy makers in both countries also continue to harbor suspicions about 
each others’ intentions. They remain on alert for changing circumstances regarding 
Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, international economic trends, US and Chinese domestic 
politics, and other developments that could seriously complicate the bilateral 
relationship. 
                                                      
3  Elizabeth Economy and Adam Segal, “The G-2 Mirage,” Foreign Affairs 88:3 (May-June 2009) 56-72.  
4  Sutter, Robert (2010). U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present Lanham, Md.: Rowman 
and Littlefield. 
5  Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations:147-168. 
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A pattern of dualism in US-China relations has arisen as part of the ostensibly positive 
equilibrium in this decade. The pattern involves constructive and cooperative 
engagement on the one hand and contingency planning or hedging on the other. It 
reflects the mix noted above of converging and competing interests and prevailing 
leadership suspicions and cooperation.  
Chinese and US contingency planning and hedging against one another sometimes 
involves actions like the respective Chinese and US military buildups that are separate 
from and develop in tandem with the respective engagement policies the two 
leaderships pursue with each other. At the same time, dualism shows as each 
government has used engagement to build positive and cooperative ties while at the 
same time seeking to use these ties to build interdependencies and webs of 
relationships that have the effect of constraining the other power from taking actions 
that oppose its interests. While the analogy is not precise, the policies of engagement 
pursued by the United States and China toward one another have featured respective 
“Gulliver strategies” that are designed to tie down aggressive, assertive or other 
negative policy tendencies of the other power through webs of interdependence in 
bilateral and multilateral relationships.  
The recent positive stasis in US-China relations is based on an increasing convergence 
of these respective engagement policies and Gulliver strategies.  But the fact remains 
that these Gulliver strategies reflect underlying suspicions and conflicting interests that 
feature prominently in the calculations of both the US and Chinese administrations as 
they pursue their relations with one another.6 
Beginning in the last half of the 1990s, Chinese leaders reviewed and reassessed their 
previous more confrontational approach to US pressures against China and 
longstanding Chinese opposition to US dominance and so-called “hegemony” in Asian 
and world affairs. These US pressures and dominance previously had been seen as 
antithetical to Chinese interests and as requiring strong opposition and resistance by 
China.  
There was debate among foreign and Chinese specialists regarding the significance of 
this reassessment. According to some foreign specialists who interviewed numerous 
Chinese officials and foreign policy specialists, the Chinese leaders by the latter 1990s 
settled on a strategy that played down differences with and resistance to the United 
States, in favor of an approach of ever greater cooperation with the American 
government. This approach was said to remain sensitive to US intrusions on important 
Chinese interests involving Taiwan, but it deemphasized past Chinese concerns 
regarding US policies and behavior designed to solidify US leadership in Asian and 
world affairs.7 
Against this background, some US and Chinese specialists judged that the new Chinese 
approach of pragmatic adjustment met and would continue to meet US approval and 
result in ever greater convergence and cooperation in US-China relations. They 
maintained that the Chinese adjustment was based on greater maturity and confidence 
among Chinese leaders as they dealt with the United States and world affairs.  Chinese 
                                                      
6  This dualism and respective Gulliver strategies are discussed in Robert Sutter, “China and US Security 
and Economic Interests: Opportunities and Challenges,” in Ross, Robert and Tunsjo, Oystein (2010) 
eds., US-China-EU Relations: Managing The New World Order London: Routledge.  
7  Goldstein, Avery (2005). Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security. 
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
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maturity and confidence were seen as based on the Chinese leaders’ success in 
promoting decades of remarkable economic growth along with military modernization 
and social change in China.  Indeed, the maturity and confidence was said to lie behind 
much of the “new thinking” said to be influencing greater Chinese involvement in 
regional and other multilateral organizations, and to off-set traditional Chinese views of 
having been victimized by outside powers and needing to be on guard to prevent future 
exploitation or oppression.8  
An opposing school of thought among US and Chinese specialists, which includes this 
writer, judges that the circumstances surrounding Chinese foreign policy and Chinese 
policy toward the United States have remained and continue to remain far too 
uncertain to posit a truly lasting Chinese strategy of cooperation and convergence with 
the United States. There have been remarkable twists and turns in Sino-American 
relations, even following the reported Chinese leadership decision in the latter 1990s to 
pursue a moderate policy toward the United States. The stability of what is seen as an 
inherently fragile relationship was challenged this decade by antipathy in the United 
States over Chinese policies and practices in economic, security, and other areas, and 
by the policies and practices of Taiwan, North Korea, Japan, and other international 
actors.9  
This writer and other specialists in this group remain unconvinced that Chinese leaders 
are confident and mature in their recent moderate approach to the United States. 
Rather, Chinese leaders are seen as often vulnerable and uncertain as they react and 
respond to policies and practices, particularly of the powerful and sometimes 
unpredictable United States government but also including the leaders of Taiwan, 
Japan, Russia, North Korea, India and others. They adjust to changing circumstances, 
weighing in each instance the costs and benefits of maintaining or changing policies, 
and thereby seek to sustain key Chinese leadership priorities and advance the 
development of what they call China’s comprehensive national power.  
In recent years, Chinese leaders are seen by this group of analysts as hedging their 
bets as they endeavor to persuade the United States and other important world powers 
of China’s avowed determination to pursue the road of peace and development. Thus, 
the new thinking seen in greater Chinese international activism and positivism 
regarding multilateral organizations and world politics highlighted in the December 
2005 Chinese White Paper entitled China’s Peaceful Development Road appears to be 
only one part of recent Chinese foreign policy. Such positive and cooperative new 
thinking seems balanced by a concurrent large-scale buildup in Chinese military forces 
backed by assertions in Chinese white papers on national security, other official 
commentary, and assertive diplomatic and military actions that make clear that 
Chinese leaders are quite prepared to protect their interests in strong and assertive 
ways under circumstances seen to warrant such actions. In the meantime, the new 
Chinese diplomatic and international activism and positivism not only fosters a positive 
and beneficent image for China. They are seen by these analysts as serving an 
important practical objective of fostering norms and practices in regional and 
                                                      
8  Medeiros, Evan and Fravel, R. Taylor (2003). “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82:6 (November-
December 2003): 22-35.  
9   Shirk, Susan (2007). China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press. Sutter, Robert 
(2007). Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War Lanham, Md.: Rowman and 
Littlefield: 3-12. 
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international organizations and circumstances that create a buffer against perceived US 
efforts to “contain” China and to impede China’s rising power. Roughly consistent with 
the image of the “Gulliver strategy” noted earlier, they foster webs of interdependent 
relationships that tie down and hamper unilateral or other actions by the US 
superpower that could intrude on important Chinese interests in Asian and world 
affairs.10 
 
2009-2010-a time of “testing” in Sino-American relations 
 
Events in 2009 
It was against this background that President Barack Obama took office in January 
2009. 2009 showed the strengths and the weaknesses of contemporary American 
engagement with China. President Barack Obama entered office to face a host of major 
international and domestic problems. China policy was not one of them. The president’s 
campaign was unusual as China policy was absent as a significant issue of debate. 
Expert opinion urged the incoming US government to pursue the positive equilibrium 
seen in closer US-China engagement developed during the latter years of the George 
W. Bush administration.11  
As noted earlier, prominent Americans saw cooperation between China and the United 
States as the most important relationship in 21st century international politics. They 
argued for a “G-2” condominium between Washington and Beijing in order to direct 
major international issues including the global economic recession, climate change, 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and nuclear weapons development in North Korea 
and Iran. 
The Obama government was more realistic about what could be expected in 
cooperation with China. It sought China’s assistance, as well as the assistance of other 
important powers, in dealing with complicated international issues. It tried to reassure 
Chinese leaders that the US government would not seriously challenge China in dealing 
with sensitive issues regarding trade protectionism, human rights, meeting with Tibet’s 
Dalai Lama, and arms sales to Taiwan. It followed the pattern developed during the 
Bush administration of dealing with the many differences in US-China relations through 
various bilateral dialogues. There are over sixty such dialogues, including an annual 
meeting led by the US Secretaries of State and Treasury, where American and Chinese 
leaders endeavor to manage their differences and broaden cooperation, out of the 
limelight of media scrutiny. As a result, the carefully managed public discourse between 
the US and Chinese governments continued to emphasize the positives in the 
relationship. Differences were dealt with in private meetings.12 
Nevertheless, many significant differences became vividly clear as the year wore on, 
underlining the limits of positive US-Chinese engagement. Chinese officials criticized 
                                                      
10  Saunders, Phillip (2006). China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 4 June 2006): 
8-9.  
11  deLisle, Jacques (2009). China Policy Under Obama Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes February 
15 
12  Liberthal, “The China-US Relationship Goes Global.”    
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the Obama government’s strategy in Southwest Asia and eschewed significant 
involvement against the Taliban. Chinese leaders complained frequently about US 
stewardship in the global economy and made repeated references to diversifying from 
the US market, investment in US government securities, and use of the US dollar. 
American complaints about restricted access to the Chinese market amid the massive 
trade deficit with China saw some moves to restrict Chinese imports and other actions 
which China greeted with trade retaliation and loud charges of protectionism.13 
Chinese and American officials endeavored to develop common ground on climate 
change, but progress was limited and public acrimony between the US and Chinese 
delegations highlighted the December international meeting in Copenhagen. President 
Obama undertook extraordinary last minute efforts to get China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa to join in support of the limited accord that was agreed to.14  
Sino-American cooperation was better in dealing with North Korea’s second nuclear 
weapons test and other provocations, but the powers remained at odds regarding the 
utility of using international pressure to compel North Korean cooperation. Beijing was 
even more reluctant to apply pressure against Iran’s nuclear development.15 
Military relations remained tense. Chinese government ships confronted and harassed 
US Navy surveillance ships patrolling in international waters that China claimed as a 
special zone in the South China Sea. China blocked military exchanges for months 
because of a US arms transfer to Taiwan late in the Bush administration.  Renewed 
military exchanges in 2009 featured strong Chinese warnings against US arms sales to 
Taiwan. 16 
Against this background, expectations for US-China relations were guarded. Deep 
mutual suspicion reportedly characterized official US-China interchange. Non-
government demonstrations of antipathy showed, especially on the American side. The 
US media was very critical of President Obama’s “weak” stance on various human 
rights, trade and other issues sensitive to Americans during his November trip to China. 
Majorities of Americans were unimpressed by the purported benefits of engagement as 
they continued to disapprove of the Chinese government and increasingly saw China as 
a threat to the United States.17 
Despite their salience, disputes and differences in US-China relations in 2009 did not 
appear sufficient to substantially upset enduring patterns of pragmatic decision making 
among the Chinese and American leaders focused on continued engagement with one 
another.  The Obama administration remained preoccupied with a wide range of 
important domestic and foreign policy questions.  In this context, a significant dispute 
with China appeared among the last things the preoccupied US government would 
want; on the contrary, the incentive to continue at least a semblance of cooperation 
and to avoid conflict with China seemed strong. 
                                                      
13  Glaser, Bonnie (2010). “Obama-Hu Summit: Success or Disappointment?”  Comparative Connections 
11:4 (January 2010), 25-35. 
14  Babington, Charles and Loven, Jennifer (2009). “Obama raced clock, chaos, comedy for climate deal,” 
www.ap.com December 19 (accessed December 21, 2009) 
15  Landler, Mark (2010). “Clinton warns China on Iran Sanctions,” New York Times January 29, 2010 
www.nytimes.com  (accessed February 23, 2010). 
16  Buckley, Chris (2010). “China PLA officers urge economic punch against US,” Reuters February 9, 2010 
www.reuters.com (accessed February 12, 2010) 
17  Glaser, “Obama-Hu Summit.” 
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The Chinese administration of President Hu Jintao set a central foreign and domestic 
policy goal for the next decade focused on China fostering a continuation of the 
prevailing international situation seen generally advantageous for China in order to 
allow for expeditious modernization in China. Exploiting this period of perceived 
“strategic opportunity” in international affairs seemed to require keeping US-China 
relations moving in positive directions.18  
The Hu Jintao administration worked hard in fostering business-like and constructive 
relations with the George W. Bush administration. In 2009, the Chinese administration 
insured that its initiatives and probes did not seriously disrupt the advantages for China 
in sustaining generally positive relations with the United States. Thus, Chinese probes 
against US military surveillance in the South China Sea subsided. Despite public 
complaints and threats, Chinese investment in US securities continued and Chinese 
reliance on the US dollar remained. While Chinese officials planned for an eventual 
reliance on the Chinese consumer to drive economic growth, Chinese entrepreneurs 
seemed determined to sustain and expand their shares of the reviving US market. 
China also acceded to varying degrees to US arguments on North Korea, Iran, and 
climate change. It resumed active military contacts cut off because of US arms sales to 
Taiwan in 2008.19 
 
Early 2010 
Unfortunately for those seeking to strengthen the image of positive cooperation and 
engagement between the two world powers, 2010 got off to an acrimonious start. 
February was a particularly bad month. Chinese officials and authoritative commentary 
took the unusual step of escalating criticism and threats against reports of planned US 
arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese administration well knew that the sales were 
expected and had probably been delayed in order to avoid controversy prior to 
President Obama’s visit to China in November 2009. Nonetheless, official Chinese 
media was full of warnings in early 2010 against the sales.  When the US package of 
$6.4 billion of weapons systems was announced in early February, the Chinese reaction 
was publicly strong. Concrete retaliation included halting some defense talks, while 
threatened retaliation was directed against US firms selling military equipment to 
Taiwan and included warnings that China would be less cooperative with US officials in 
dealing with such salient international problems as Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons 
program.20  
The Obama government made no secret of the fact that in deference to China and 
concern over the president’s trip to Beijing in November, the US government had 
postponed the US president’s meeting with the Dalai Lama rather than meet with the 
Tibetan leader during his visit to Washington in October 2009. Thus, when news of the 
rescheduled Obama-Dalai Lama meeting surfaced in February 2010, Chinese officials 
                                                      
18  Lampton, David Michael, The Three Faces of Chinese Power Berkely CA: University of California Press: 
32-36. 
19  See quarterly reviews of US-China relations in Comparative Connections www.csis.org/pacfor  
20   Romberg, Alan (2010). “Beijing’s Hard Line against US Arms Sales to Taiwan,” PACNET Newsletter #4 
February 3, 2010 www.csis.org/pacfor  
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and media once again appeared to be trying to intimidate the Americans by warning 
against the meeting and its consequences for US-China relations.21  
 
China’s Tougher Posture—Competing Views 
Coming after the sometimes acrimonious Sino-American interaction at the international 
climate change meeting in Copenhagen and following limited US success in eliciting 
greater Chinese support for key US international objectives regarding climate change, 
Iran’s nuclear program, and international currency and trade issues, the tougher public 
posture of China prompted a range of speculation by media observers and international 
affairs specialists in the United States, China, other parts of Asia and the West. While 
there were often widely varying views and perspectives, the debate focused on two 
general groups. 
The more prominent group warned of a potential or actual turning point in China-US 
relations.22  The specialists and media commentators in this group tended to see rising 
China as having reached a point of greater power and influence in world affairs, and 
this rise was now prompting China to press the United States for concessions on key 
issues of longstanding dispute like Taiwan and Tibet. China’s greater “confidence” and 
“assertiveness” also were prompting Beijing to take tough stances in disputes with the 
United States on currency and trade issues, human rights practices, and cyber attacks, 
and to do less in support of US-backed international efforts regarding Iran, North 
Korea, and climate change. Some saw China taking the lead and setting the agenda in 
US-China relations, with the United States placed in a weaker and reactive position.23 It 
was common among these commentators for the Americans and others in Asia and the 
West among them to argue for a tougher US stance against China, a so-called 
American “push-back” against perceived Chinese assertiveness.24 However, some 
specialists in this group judged that the Obama government, with its many 
preoccupations, was not up to the task of managing the newly assertive China; they 
saw a shift in international power in Asian and world affairs away from US leadership 
and toward China developing greater momentum.25 
The specific points made by these commentators and specialists included the following: 
- China emerged from the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 stronger than other 
major powers, including the United States, which remained stuck in a slow recovery 
with large unemployment. Commentators in China and abroad commonly saw 
economics as the prime cause for the power shift away from US leadership and 
toward China that they perceived was well underway in Asian and world affairs. 
Indeed, it was judged by some that the international economic system was 
undergoing a significant change, away from Western-led norms and institutions and 
                                                      
21  “China warns against Obama-Dalai Lama meeting,” Reuters February 3, 2010 www.reuters.com 
(accessed February 23, 2010). 
22  Shambaugh, David (2010). “The Chinese tiger shows its claws,” Financial Times February 17, 2010 
www.ft.com (accessed February 23, 2010). 
23  Hoagland, James (2010). “As Obama bets on Asia, regional players hedge,” Washington Post February 
11, 2010 www.washingtonpost.com (accessed February 23, 2010). 
24  Marr, Kendra (2010). “W.H. takes tougher tone with China, “ Politico February 16, 2010 
www.politico.com (accessed February 23, 2010). 
25  Jacques, Martin (2010). “Crouching dragon, weakened eagle,” International Herald Tribune February 16, 
2010, www.iht.com (accessed February 23, 2010). 
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toward international regimes where rising China would play an ever greater role 
seen at odds with the liberal Western order fostered by the United States. 
- In his visit to China in November 2009 and other US-China interchange, President 
Obama and his administration signaled a strong need for US cooperation with China 
on a wide variety of international as well as bilateral issues. The US policy agenda 
was seen to underline the necessity of the US government working closely with 
China.  Under these circumstances, Chinese leaders were portrayed by Chinese and 
foreign experts to have discerned that America needed China more than China 
needed the United States. In the past, such calculations were seen behind upsurges 
in Chinese pressure on the US government regarding Taiwan and other issues. In 
the current case, President Obama was viewed as “weak” and needing to 
accommodate China, which could afford to make stronger demands and to do less 
to accommodate its American partner. 
- One line of analysis in this group said that the incentive for senior Chinese leaders 
to adopt tougher and less cooperative policies toward the United States had less to 
do with their confidence in international affairs and more to do with their concerns 
about managing domestic Chinese pressures. Chinese elites and popular opinion 
reportedly were influenced by international and Chinese commentary highlighting 
China’s rise from the economic crisis while the United States lagged behind. These 
segments of Chinese opinion joined with those officials in China representing 
military, domestic economic and other stakeholders in China’s ever growing 
international profile who were not associated with the more experienced and 
generally diplomatic approach of the professional Chinese foreign policy 
establishment. The domestic, military and other officials joined with popular and 
elite opinion in pushing for greater attention to Chinese interests and greater 
resistance to US requests or pressures. In order to preserve domestic stability and 
the continued smooth rule of the communist party in China, President Hu Jintao and 
other leaders were seen to have little choice but to accommodate domestic forces 
pushing for a harder position against America.26 
 
The second group of Chinese and international observers was much less prominent 
than the above noted commentators during early 2010. The specialists and 
commentators of the second group duly acknowledged China’s more publicly assertive 
stance on Taiwan and Tibet; limited Chinese cooperation with the United States on 
issues ranging from currency and trade issues to climate change and Iran’s nuclear 
program also was noted. These observers often anticipated a difficult year ahead for 
Sino-American relations, especially as the Obama government was pressed by domestic 
economic and political forces in the United States to adopt a firmer stance against 
China on sensitive issues like human rights, trade disputes, and Iran. 
However, these specialists and commentators tended to see more continuity than 
change in Sino-American relations.27 They disagreed with idea that China had now 
reached a point where it was prepared to confront America on key issues and or where 
                                                      
26  Wong, Edward (2010). “Rift grows as US and China seek differing goals,” New York Times February 20, 
2010 www.nytimes.com (accessed February 23, 2010) 
27  Pei, Minxin (2010), “The Tension is overstated,” International Herald Tribune February 16, 2010 
www.iht.com (accessed February 23, 2010); Elizabeth Economy, “The US and China Have at it Again; 
but it’s much ado about nothing,” http://blogs.cfr.org February 2, 2010 (accessed February 12, 2010).  
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it was prepared to risk substantial deterioration in Sino-American relations. Some of 
these observers tended to see the Chinese pressure on Taiwan and Tibet as “probes” or 
“tests” of US resolve, not unlike the probes China appeared to carry out in the South 
China Sea in 2009 and in threatening that year to move away substantially from the US 
dollar and to move away from focus on the US market for Chinese exports. As noted 
earlier, China was viewed to have pulled back from those 2009 initiatives once it was 
clear that their consequences would be adverse to broad Chinese interests.28  
Among specific reasons for judging continuation of Chinese efforts to avoid substantial 
conflict and sustain positive engagement in the United States were: 
- China’s dependence on the US economy and its reliance on the international order 
led by the United States remained enormous. The ability of an aroused United 
States to complicate and undermine Chinese interests in sustaining the “strategic 
opportunity” of an advantageous international environment in the first two decades 
of the twenty first century also remained enormous.  
- China was compelled in the previous decade to reverse its strong opposition to US 
hegemonism in the interests of a policy to reassure the United States and its 
associates that China’s rise would be peaceful. It did so in major part to avoid US 
balancing that would impede China’s growth and so complicate China’s rise that it 
might lead to the end of the CCP regime.29 Reversing such a policy approach would 
be a very difficult undertaking for a Hu Jintao administration entering its last years 
with a focus on smooth succession from one leadership generation to the next. 
Thus, the incentive for the Hu Jintao administration to sustain generally positive 
Sino-US relations was reinforced by the pending generational leadership succession 
due to take place at the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2012. 
Preparations for this decennial event involve widespread behind-the-scenes 
bargaining over policy, power, and appointment issues that are best carried out in 
an atmosphere where Chinese leaders are not diverted by serious controversy 
among the many issues they face at home and abroad, notably Sino-American 
relations.  
- If China were to choose to confront the United States, it would presumably be 
inclined to follow the past pattern China used in dealing with international initiatives 
against potential or real adversaries. That pattern involves “united front” tactics 
whereby China is sensitive to and endeavors to build closer ties with other powers 
as it prepares to confront the adversary, the “main” target. However, prevailing 
conditions in Chinese foreign relations did not show particularly good Chinese 
relations with many important world power centers as China faced the United States 
in 2010. China’s relations with India, Japan, Western Europe, South Korea, 
Australia, and arguably Russia were very mixed and often troubled.  With the 
exception of Japan, they were more troubled and less cooperative than they were 
earlier in the decade.  
 
                                                      
28  These points and those in the bullets paragraphs below benefited from off-the-record consultations and 
meetings the author had with two dozen American specialists and five Chinese officials in Washington DC 
during February 2010. 
29  Lampton, Three Faces of Chinese Power 32-34; Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and 
Policy since the Cold War (second edition) Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010, p. 10. 
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Subsequent events—sustained positive equilibrium 
Events later in 2010 did not resolve the debate between those commentators seeing an 
assertive China prepared to push the United States on differences, and those 
commentators seeing Chinese and US leaders seeing their interests well served through 
policies and practices that avoided conflict and sustained a positive equilibrium in US 
China relations. However, the zig zags of Chinese behavior challenging US policies and 
practices appeared to have limits. The top Chinese leaders made clear their concern to 
preserve and develop the positive equilibrium in US-China relations, notably by 
beginning preparations to send President Hu to the United States on an official visit in 
early 2011.30 
The Americans were disappointed by China’s refusal to condemn North Korea for its 
sinking of a South Korean warship, the Choenan, killing 46 South Korean sailors. South 
Korea, backed by the United States, sought to punish North Korea short of violence, 
notably through the United Nations. China insured that North Korea was not officially 
the target of UN actions. South Korea and the United States announced military 
exercises in the seas on both sides of the peninsula. For the first time in recent 
memory, China publicly opposed the exercises in the Yellow Sea as a threat to China. 
The Chinese complaints became a focal point of sharply worded commentary in official 
and unofficial Chinese media for weeks. Chinese comment especially objected to the US 
aircraft carrier based in Japan, the George Washington, taking part in the Yellow Sea 
exercises.  
Meanwhile, Chinese officials were privately and publicly expanding and refining their 
recently avowed concern with supporting their “core interests” to include broad claims 
to island groups in the South China Sea also claimed by other states. The presumably 
uncompromising claims involving Chinese “core” interests included Chinese unilateral 
assertions and attempted regulation of military surveillance, fishing, oil exploration and 
other rights heretofore used the United States and neighboring Southeast Asian 
countries, among others.31 
China was put on the defensive in reacting to interventions, including a notable 
statement by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, at the annual ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi on July 23, 2010 regarding recent tensions in the South 
China Sea. China’s foreign ministry interpreted the U.S. intervention as an attack on 
China. The ARF meeting also saw a new U.S. presidential commitment, backed by 
ASEAN, to participate actively in the East Asian Summit, raising the profile of that 
regional body over China’s preference for Asian only regional groups. Further 
complicating China’s regional calculus were prominent advances in U.S. military and 
other relations with Vietnam shown during celebrations of a US-Vietnam anniversary in 
August that involved exercises with a U.S. aircraft carrier deployed near disputed 
regions of the South China Sea. The aircraft carrier, the George Washington, was the 
same ship Chinese commentary had harshly objected to participating in announced 
South Korean-US exercises in the Yellow Sea. The US contingent of ships included an 
advanced destroyer that entered Vietnam’s Danang harbor. The ship had the 
symbolically important name, The John McCain. 
                                                      
30  Glaser, Bonnie (2010), “U.S.-Chinese Relations,” Comparative Connections 12:3 (October 2010), 
www.csis.org/pacfor  
31  “China-Southeast Asia Relations,” Comparative Connections 12:3 (October 2010) www.csis.org/pacfor  
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China long had relied on a regional approach based on growing trade and other 
economic contacts and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy designed to reassure 
Southeast Asian neighbors and their regional grouping, The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). As disputes in the South China Sea with regional claimants and 
the United States gained prominence in recent years, China became more assertive in 
defending its claims. It notably reconfigured military ships for use in enforcing 
unilateral fishing bans, deployed strong forces from all three Chinese naval fleets in 
shows of force in area, and asserted that China’s claims to the islands, waters and 
resources of South China Sea represented a “core interest” of China that presumably 
brooks no compromise. 
Chinese officials and commentary in Chinese media at first countered the U.S. 
intervention at the ARF meeting and other American policy initiatives in Southeast Asia 
with charges directed at the United States for its alleged self-serving and destabilizing 
intentions. Those attacks meshed with public Chinese attacks against concurrent U.S. 
military exercises with South Korean forces in reaction to North Korea’s sinking of a 
South Korean warship, the Cheonan.  
Later, some Chinese commentary dissented from the harsh public approach to the 
United States. The criticism of the United States and others over the South China Sea 
disputes and other issues subsided. For the time being at least, it appeared that China 
would remain focused on publicly stressing trade and reassuring diplomacy in 
Southeast Asia, while defending its territorial claims and continuing to build military 
capabilities.  
In sum, China seemed unprepared to allow the disputes with the United States over the 
South China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and related matters to escalate in ways that would 
seriously undermine US-China relations. President Hu Jintao and other senior Chinese 
leaders went out of their way to greet visiting US envoys not of their rank and 
conveyed a strong public message of reassurance that China would sustain positive 
engagement with the United States. Indications of limits of Chinese assertive against 
the interests of the United States, senior Chinese military leaders reversed recent 
criticism and  told American officials and the world that China sought resumed military 
exchanges with the United States.  More importantly, President Hu began preparations 
for a major visit to Washington in early 2011. 
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